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The dramatic postwar decline in the labor force participation of older men in 
the United States has motivated a sizable body of literature on retirement be- 
havior. Three factors, in particular, have been studied extensively: the growth 
of  the Social Security program (see, for example, Burtless 1986; Burtless 
and Moffitt 1984; Diamond and Hausman 1984; Hausman and Wise 1985; 
Sueyoshi 1989), the increased availability and generosity of  private pensions 
(Stock and Wise 1990a, 1990b), and the expansion of federal disability insur- 
ance (Bound and Waidmann 1992). One potentially important factor that until 
recently has not received much attention is the availability of health insurance 
for retirees. This oversight is especially surprising given the rather consistent 
evidence that health status is an important determinant in the retirement deci- 
sion (Bazzoli 1985; Diamond and Hausman 1984). If health status matters in 
the decision about when to retire, it seems quite natural that health insurance 
should matter as well. 
The increased availability of  health insurance for older Americans, espe- 
cially retirees, has come in several forms. First among them is the introduction 
in the mid- 1960s of Medicare, a federal program that provides near-universal 
health insurance coverage for those over age 65. A second source of  health 
insurance that has grown in importance, particularly for those under age 65 
who are not yet eligible for Medicare, is employer-provided postretirement 
health insurance. While only 30% of men who retired in the early 1960s re- 
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ceived health insurance from their former employers, this fraction increased to 
almost half for those retiring in the 1980s (Madrian 1994). 
This paper looks at the effect on retirement of a third source of health insur- 
ance for early retirees, namely continuation coverage benefits. During the late 
1970s and early 1980s many states mandated that employers allow employees 
who leave their jobs to continue purchasing their group health insurance for a 
specified number of months. These continuation benefits were extended to all 
workers in 1986 as part of the federal Consolidated  Omnibus Budget Reconcil- 
iation Act  (COBRA) legislation. Although this coverage is available to all 
workers regardless of age, it should be particularly attractive to older workers 
who face a relatively high price for health insurance in the private market and 
who are more likely to be subject to the preexisting-conditions  exclusions that 
are characteristic of such policies. 
To identify the effect of continuation benefits on retirement, we exploit the 
fact that these benefits were mandated at different times by  different states 
(and finally the federal government) and that the generosity of  the mandates 
varied across states as well. Using data from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS), we find a strong correlation between the availability of  continuation 
benefits and the likelihood that individuals are retired. Our key finding is that, 
among men aged 55-64,  one year of continuation benefits increases the proba- 
bility of being retired by 1 percentage point; this is 5.4% of the baseline proba- 
bility of being retired for this group. Furthermore, we find that, although the 
estimated percentage-point effects are strongest  near the age of Medicare eligi- 
bility, as a fraction of  baseline retirement probabilities they actually decline 
with age. Although this latter result is somewhat counterintuitive,  it is consis- 
tent with other work that examines the effect of continuation coverage on flows 
into retirement (Gruber and Madrian  1995). We  also find that continuation 
coverage mandates significantly increase the likelihood that early retirees are 
covered by employer-provided health insurance after retirement. This effect is 
much larger than the implied effect on retirement, suggesting that much of the 
increase in coverage is occumng among those individuals who would have 
retired even in the absence of such benefits. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 4.1 provides some moti- 
vation for why health insurance should matter in the early retirement decision. 
Section 4.2 outlines the state and federal continuation coverage laws, which 
we use to identify the effect of health insurance on retirement. This is followed 
in  section 4.3 by  a model that formalizes the effect of health insurance on 
retirement. The data and regression framework are presented in  section 4.4, 
and the results follow in section 4.5 along with a comparison with our findings 
from dynamic models of retirement behavior. Section 4.6 considers the impact 
of continuation coverage mandates on  insurance coverage. The paper con- 
cludes in section 4.7 with a discussion of the methodological and policy impli- 
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4.1  Health Insurance and Retirement: Should It Matter? 
The high and variable level of medical expenditures for persons aged 55-64, 
without the guarantee of public coverage through Medicare for those over age 
65, means that the availability of  health insurance coverage could be a key 
factor in determining the timing of retirement. Until recently, however, there 
has been little study of the effect of retiree health insurance coverage on retire- 
ment patterns. Two recent papers have attempted to model the role of health 
insurance in the retirement decision. Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1994) in- 
corporate the value of Medicare into an option value model of retirement and 
find no effect of Medicare eligibility on the retirement hazard. Their result is 
not surprising, however, as they estimate their model on a sample of workers 
from the same firm, all of whom have employer-provided postretirement health 
insurance that is much more generous than Medicare. Gustman and Steinmeier 
(1994) use information from the Retirement History Survey, a longitudinal sur- 
vey from the 1970s, to ascertain whether individuals have employer-provided 
retiree health insurance, and data from the 1977 National Medical Care Expen- 
diture Survey, to impute the value of that insurance based on individual charac- 
teristics. They also find very small effects of retiree health insurance on retire- 
ment decisions. 
The results of these two studies are at odds with both intuition and with what 
individuals report about the importance of health insurance in the retirement 
decision. In a recent Gallup poll, 63% of working Americans reported that they 
“would delay retirement until becoming eligible for Medicare [age 651 if their 
employers were not going to provide health coverage” despite the fact that 
50% “said they would prefer to retire early-by  age 62” (Employee Benefits 
Research Institute 1990). The apparent contradiction between the importance 
of  health insurance as stated by  individuals and that estimated by  these two 
previous studies provides a further motivation for our research. 
4.1.1  Health Status of Older Individuals 
That individuals should cite health insurance as an important consideration 
in the retirement decision is not surprising, as older persons are fairly likely 
to need expensive medical care. Tables 4.1-4.4  compare the health status of 
individuals by age along a number of dimensions. The simplest measure, self- 
reported health status, is shown in table 4.1. The fraction of individuals who 
report  being  in  fair  or  poor  health  increases  markedly  from  ages  45-54 
(19.7%) to ages 55-64  (31.3%). While recent research has suggested that self- 
reported health status may be a poor indicator of the actual severity of an indi- 
vidual’s clinical conditions (Bazzoli 1985), it may be the most accurate mea- 
sure of an individual’s valuation of health insurance coverage. Thus, these fig- 
ures suggest that insurance valuation will rise dramatically with age. 
Furthermore,  as  table  4.2  shows,  health  status  as  measured by  doctor- 118  Jonathan Gruber and Brigitte C.  Madrian 
Table 4.1  Self-Reported Health Status by Age (%) 
Health Status 
Age  Excellent  Good  Fair  Poor 
25-34  36.4  53.1  9.5  1.1 
35-44  32.0  54.6  11.9  1.5 
45-54  27.8  52.5  15.6  4.1 
55-64  18.0  50.7  24.9  6.4 
65 +  9.3  43.1  36.1  11.4 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey. 
Note:  The numbers in the table give the fraction of  individuals  who report  having the given 
health status. 
Table 4.2  Incidence of Health Problems by Age (%) 









































































Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey. 
Nure: The numbers in the table give the fraction of  individuals who report ever having had the 
listed medical condition. 
diagnosed health problems deteriorates with age as well. The incidence of 
many of the health problems listed (stroke, cancer, heart attack, arteriosclero- 
sis, emphysema,  and heart disease) more than doubles between 45-54 and ages 
55-64. Furthermore, almost three-quarters of those aged 55-64 have been di- 
agnosed with at least one of the eleven conditions listed. Not surprisingly, rela- 
tive to those aged 45-54,  individuals 55-64  are more likely to be admitted to 
the hospital over the course of a year and spend more time there once admitted 
(table 4.3). 
The most direct evidence that health insurance should be valued relatively 
highly by older workers, however, is that the actual medical expenses incurred 
by those aged 55-64 are much higher than those of younger individuals (table 
4.4).  In every category not only do expenditures  rise with age, but the variance 119  Health Insurance and Retirement 
Table 4.3  Annual Medical Care Utilization by Age 
25-34  35-44  45-54  55-64  65+ 
Fraction admitted to hospital (%)  9.2  6.8  8.7  11.0  20.1 
Number of admissions (if ever 
Nights in hospital (if ever 
admitted)  1.17  1.24  1.39  1.5  1.5 
admitted)  5.5  6.8  9.3  11.8  13.8 
(%)  52.9  55.6  61.1  71.1  81.9 
(if any prescribed medicines)  5.2  6.6  11.5  14.7  18.5 
Fraction who visited a doctor (%)  64.1  67.1  71.1  77.9  85.8 
visited a doctor)  4.6  4.6  5.5  6.0  7.4 
Fraction with prescribed medicines 
Number of prescribed medicines 
Number of doctor visits (if 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey. 
Table 4.4  Average Annual Medical Expenditures by Age (1990 dollars) 










expenditure > 0 
Total 
Source: Authors’ calculations  using data from the  1980 National Medical Care Utilization and 
Expenditure Survey (inflated to 1990 dollars using the Medical Care Component of the consumer 
price index). 
Note:  Standard deviation of expenditures is in parentheses. 120  Jonathan Gruber and Brigitte C. Madrian 
increases as well. In 1990 dollars, total medical expenditures of those 55-64 
averaged $2,144. This represents 5.4% of average total family income for this 
age group, 6.9% of  average total family income for retired individuals, and 
30%  of the average pension income of early retirees.' A one-standard-deviation 
increase in expenditures for a 55-64-year-old would represent an additional 
16.5% of family income. Total family medical expenditures would naturally 
constitute a much higher fraction of income. Thus, it is easy to see why older 
individuals should be concerned about their health insurance coverage after 
retirement. 
4.1.2  Health Insurance Coverage and Costs 
Given the costs of health care for older workers, it should not be surprising 
that older individuals are no more likely to be uninsured than their younger 
counterparts, as is shown in table 4.5. The sources of health insurance cover- 
age, however, differ with age. Even though employment-based health insur- 
ance is the predominant source of coverage regardless of age, older individuals 
are less likely than younger persons to have employment-based health insur- 
ance and much more likely to be covered by a nongroup (individual) or other 
group policy. This suggests that individuals who retire early but who do not 
have access to employer-provided health insurance turn to the individual mar- 
ket for insurance. 
The bottom two panels of table 4.5 break down the sources of health insur- 
ance coverage by employment status. There are three major differences be- 
tween the sources of health insurance coverage for those who are and are not 
employed. First, one-fifth of  nonworking older persons are insured through 
Medicare or Medicaid, while only 1  % of the older employed receive coverage 
from one of these two sources. Second, older nonworking individuals are 40% 
less likely to be uninsured than their younger counterparts. Third, relative to 
the young, the older nonworking are six times more likely to be covered by 
employer-provided health insurance in their own name. 
These last two differences are explained in large part by the availability of 
employer-provided postretirement health insurance. Forty-five percent of indi- 
viduals work in firms that provide retiree health insurance benefits.*  The older 
nonworking, who are more likely to be retired than the young nonworking, are 
therefore more likely to be covered by  employer-provided retiree health in- 
surance. 
There are, nevertheless, a substantial number of older individuals who are 
not covered by either employer or government-provided health insurance. It is 
these individuals  who find themselves  in the market for individual health insur- 
ance and who we would therefore expect to benefit from the availability of 
1. Exoenditures as a fraction of income are calculated using income data from the March 1990  - 
CPS . 
2.  See Madrian  (1994) for background  on  the structure  and availability of  postretirement 
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Table 4.5  Insurance Coverage by Age and  Employment Status (%) 
Employment- 
Based 
Other  CHAMPUS/  Medicare/ 
Any  Own Name  Group  Nongroup  CHAMPVA  Medicaid  Uninsured 
~~~~ 
All individuals 
25-54  71.6  51.1  1.2  5.9  5.7  5.6  15.4 
55-64  64.5  44.8  4.1  14.5  7.7  10.4  12.0 
25-54  78.5  62.7  1.1  5.8  4.9  1.2  13.5 
55-64  76.3  63.1  4.0  12.6  6.8  0.8  10.1 
25-54  44.2  4.2  1.3  6.2  8.8  23.4  23.0 
55-64  51.6  24.7  4.3  16.6  9.2  20.9  14.1 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey. 
Employed 
Not employed 
continuation coverage. The reason is simple-insurance  in the individual mar- 
ket is typically quite expensive. 
Employers have significant cost advantages in providing health insurance. 
By pooling the risks of many individuals, they are able to lower administrative 
expenses and reduce adverse selection. These two factors alone are estimated 
to reduce the cost of providing insurance in large (ten thousand or more em- 
ployees) firms relative to small (one to four employees) firms by 40% (Con- 
gressional Research Service 1988). For older individuals the cost differential 
between employer-provided and individual health insurance is exacerbated be- 
cause policies in the individual market are typically age-rated, while within 
the firm younger workers subsidize the health insurance costs of their older 
coworkers. The Congressional Research Service (1988) reports that the cost to 
employers of providing insurance coverage for 55-64-year-old  males is three 
times that of providing coverage to males under 40; for females, the ratio is 
two to 0ne.3 
In Massachusetts the average cost of family health insurance coverage per 
employee in 1989 was $3,882.4  When inflated by the medical care component 
of  the consumer price index, this is equivalent to $5,047 in 1993 dollars. In 
contrast, a New England commercial insurance company is offering a family 
policy for a 58-year-old male with a one-year preexisting-conditions exclusion 
at a price of  $8,640. This represents 26% of  the average family income of 
retired individuals aged 55-64  in Massachusetts. Individual policies may also 
be  medically underwritten  so  that  sick individuals may  face  substantially 
higher prices or may not be able to purchase a policy at all. 
3. Of course, to the extent employer costs can be shifted to the wages of employees in an age- 
4.  Authors’  calculation  using  unpublished  data from the  Health  Insurance  Association  of 
specific fashion, older individuals will bear these higher costs. See the discussion in section 4.3. 
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The coverage available in the private market not only is expensive, but also 
is typically less generous than employer-provided health insurance. Table 4.6 
compares the health insurance benefits of individuals covered under group and 
nongroup policies in  1977. In every category, those covered under nongroup 
policies receive more limited benefits. Relative to those with nongroup cover- 
age, those with group policies are more than twice as likely to receive major 
medical coverage or coverage for physician office visits and prescription drugs, 
and more than 50% more likely to receive ambulance, mental health, and out- 
patient diagnostic service coverage. Furthermore, nongroup policies generally 
feature both higher deductibles and higher copayments. Thus, relative to the 
individual market, group coverage offers individuals higher-quality insurance 
coverage at a significantly lower price. 
4.2  Continuation Coverage Laws 
For those individuals whose employers do not offer retiree health insurance, 
an alternative to purchasing health insurance in the individual market is pro- 
vided by various state and federal continuation  coverage laws. These laws man- 
date that employers sponsoring group health insurance plans offer terminating 
employees and their families the right to continue their health insurance cover- 
age through the employer’s plan for a specified  period of time. The laws gener- 
Table 4.6  Group and Nongroup Health Insurance  Benefits, 1977 (%) 
Fraction of Individuals with 
Specified Benefit 
Group Plans  Nongroup Plans 
Primary benefits 
Major medical coverage  86.9  39.1 
Hospital room and board  98.4  91.4 
Surgery  97.6  91.6 
Physician office visit  87.9  40.4 
Ambulance  89.0  54.0 
Outpatient diagnostic services  95.9  66.0 
hescribed medicines  87.3  30.3 
Mental health  92.2  66.0 
Other benefits 
Generosity of benefits (conditional on 
having benefit) 
Major medical deductible < $100  94.3  61.6 
Full semiprivate room charge  77.8  38.2 
80-100%  of usual common and 
reasonable surgical charge  70.6  60.0 
80-100%  of usual common and 
reasonable physician charge  91.8  81.3 
Source: Farley (1986), tables 45-58. 123  Health Insurance and Retirement 
ally apply to all separations (except those due to an employee’s gross miscon- 
duct), although in some states benefits are restricted to those who leave their 
jobs in~oluntarily.~  They often also provide benefits to divorced or widowed 
spouses and their families. The first such law was implemented by Minnesota 
in  1974. More than twenty states passed similar laws over the next decade 
before the federal government, as part of  the 1985 COBRA, mandated such 
coverage at the national level. Continuation coverage is now  commonly re- 
ferred to as COBRA coverage, a nomenclature we will also use. 
The various state statutes are summarized in table 4.7.6 The length of cover- 
age is generally quite short, from three to six months, although nine states 
mandate coverage of nine months or more. Although most state laws stipulate 
that an employee must have been covered by an employer’s insurance for three 
to six months before being eligible for continuation  coverage, this requirement 
is not likely to be binding on older workers, most of  whom have been with 
their current employer for many years.’ The state laws also apply only to firms 
that actually purchase insurance through an insurance company; self-insured 
firms,  under  the  1974  Employee  Retirement  Income  and  Security Act 
(ERISA), are not subject to these (or any other) state mandates.* 
Although similar in spirit, the state and federal laws differ in a number of 
important ways. First, the length of coverage mandated under the federal law, 
eighteen months, equals or exceeds that mandated by all but one state (as of 
January 1987, Connecticut law provides for up to twenty months of c~verage).~ 
Second, there is no minimal length of time for which an employee must be 
covered under an employer’s plan before being eligible for continuation bene- 
fits. Third, the federal law applies to self-insured firms, who are exempt from 
the state laws, as well as to those who purchase their coverage from insurers. 
The federal law, however, does not apply to small firms employing less than 
twenty workers. Finally, employees of religious organizations and the federal 
government were exempt from COBRA, although federal employees have sub- 
sequently been included (beginning in 1990). When the specific details of the 
5. Because retirement is a voluntary separation, we treat those states whose laws apply only to 
involuntarily terminated employees as states without laws. 
6. Details on state laws are from Hewitt (1985) and Thompson Publishing Group (1992) and 
have been cross-checked against the actual state statutes. Table 4.7 lists only those states with laws 
that apply to employees who terminate their employment voluntarily. 
7. Almost 95% of  retirees have job tenure of at least ten years by the time they retire (Madrian 
1994). 
8. In a related paper we incorporate a correction factor that accounts for the exclusion of some 
firms from the effects of these laws (Gruber and Madrian 1995). This has little effect on the sig- 
nificance of the estimates of the effect of continuation coverage on retirement, although the magni- 
tude increases two- to threefold. 
9. Eighteen months is the maximum length of coverage available following the voluntary or 
involuntary termination of employment. COBRA also provides up to thirty-six months of coverage 
for family members who would otherwise lose their insurance coverage through events such as an 
employee’s death, divorce from the employee, or the employee’s eligibility for Medicare. 124  Jonathan Gruber and Brigitte C. Madrian 
Table 4.7  State Continuation Coverage Laws 
Effective  Months of  Effective  Months of 

































































































Sources: Hewitt (1985); Thompson F’ublishing Group (1992); state statutes. 
state and federal statutes are at odds, firm provision of continuation benefits is 
governed by the law that provides for more generous coverage. 
The effective dates of the state laws are listed in table 4.7. The federal cover- 
age mandated under COBRA was phased in. Beginning in July 1986, firms 
had to offer continuation benefits at the start of their next plan year. For work- 
ers provided health insurance under union contracts, such benefits did not have 
to be offered until the next contract negotiation after January 1987. 
Both the state and federal laws stipulate that the employee must pay the full 
cost of the coverage. At the federal level, this is defined specifically as 102% 
of  the average employer cost of providing coverage. The coverage must be 
identical to that provided to similarly situated active employees, including the 
option to continue enrollment in supplemental insurance plans (such as for 
vision or dental care) if these are available. Although 102% of the employer’s 
cost is typically much more than individuals pay as active employees, it is, as 
already noted, substantially  less than the cost of buying equivalent coverage in 
the private market, especially for older workers. 
Because continuation coverage is a relatively new phenomenon (at least at 
the national level), information on the extent of continuation coverage is some- 
what scarce. Zedlewski (1993) estimates that, in 1988,5.2% of retired workers 
aged 55-64  were covered by COBRA health insurance. This figure must be 
interpreted relative to the number of individuals who could be expected to 
take up such coverage. The 52% of individuals aged 55-64  with retiree health 
insurance are not likely to be covered, and the 21% of individuals who were 125  Health Insurance and Retirement 
not insured through their former employer are not eligible. Similarly, those 
who have been retired for more than eighteen months have exceeded their po- 
tential eligibility. Tabulations from the  1987 National Medical Expenditure 
Survey indicate that one-third of retired individuals aged 55-64  have been re- 
tired for less than eighteen months. If we take the group who could potentially 
be affected by COBRA to be one-third of retired individuals between ages 55 
and 64  who worked in firms that provided health insurance but did not provide 
retiree health insurance, we would expect at most 9% of early retirees to be 
covered. That 5.2% receive continuation benefits suggests that 58% of the re- 
tired population who would be at all likely to be covered by COBRA actually 
are. As knowledge about the availability of  such coverage has become more 
widespread since 1988, this fraction may be higher today. 
An alternative  calculation is possible using figures reported in Flynn (1992). 
She uses data from a large firm that administers COBRA claims to estimate 
that 23% of individuals who qualified for COBRA coverage because of retire- 
ment elected to receive benefits. If we expected only the 30% of individuals in 
firms that offer health insurance but do not offer retiree health insurance to 
even consider purchasing COBRA insurance, this take-up rate implies that 
75% of those most likely to be covered by continuation benefits actually are. 
Both of these calculations, therefore, suggest that retirees without an altema- 
tive source of health insurance coverage are quite likely to elect continuation 
coverage. 
For all COBRA beneficiaries, the average length of time on COBRA was 
seven months (Flynn 1992).  Individuals  over age 61, however, maintained their 
coverage for a much longer period of time-about  twelve months on average. 
This finding is not surprising for two reasons. First, younger individuals are 
more likely to find alternative coverage through a new job or a spouse’s em- 
ployment. Second, COBRA coverage provides a larger subsidy for older work- 
ers; with a lower relative price, they should therefore demand more coverage. 
Table 4.8 compares the distribution of health insurance coverage in 1984, 
two years before COBRA was first implemented, and in 1989, two years after 
it had been phased in. Note that employment-based health insurance coverage 
is more prevalent after COBRA, and that this effect is confined to those who 
are not employed, exactly the group whom we  would expect to be insured 
under COBRA. This finding is similar to evidence presented in Rogowski and 
Karoly (1  992), who examined the primary source of insurance coverage after 
retirement, based on the source of insurance coverage before retirement, before 
and after COBRA. They find that in the pre-COBRA period, 72% of individu- 
als who retired from jobs with employment-based health insurance continued 
to be covered by  that insurance upon retirement. After COBRA, this figure 
rises to 78.5%.1° Taken together, the evidence on take-up rates and the increase 
in the extent of employer-provided health insurance coverage among early re- 
10. We  present a stronger test of the effect of  continuation coverage mandates  on insurance 
coverage in section 4.6. 126  Jonathan Gruber and Brigitte C. Madrian 
Table 4.8  Health Insurance Coverage before and  after COBRA (%) 
-  ~~~~  ~  ~~ 
All Individuals  Employed  Not Employed 
25-54  55-64  25-54  55-64  25-54  55-64 
Insurance coverage in 1984 
Any private health insurance 
Health insurance in own name 
Employ  ment-based 
Not employment-based 
Covered as a dependent 
Insurance coverage in 1989 
Any private health insurance 
Health insurance in own name 
Employment-based 
Not employment-based 
Covered as a dependent 
82.1  83.7  89.1  92.5  60.1  74.1 
52.1  47.4  66.7  68.9  5.9  23.6 
5.1  12.5  5.1  10.4  5.2  14.7 
24.2  23.4  16.8  12.8  47.7  35.0 
82.4  84.3  88.6  92.1  57.3  74.9 
54.7  49.2  66.4  68.1  7.1  26.6 
5.3  12.9  5.2  9.6  5.2  16.8 
22.0  21.8  16.4  14.4  43.7  30.6 
Source: Authors'  calculations using data from the Survey of  Income and Program Participation, 
1984 Wave 3 and 1987 Wave 7. 
tirees after COBRA suggests that older workers who retire early and who do 
not have an alternative source of coverage actually avail themselves of the con- 
tinuation benefits to which they are entitled. 
4.3  Modeling the Effect of Health Insurance on Retirement 
We  present a simple graphical exposition of the effect of health insurance 
benefits on the retirement decision, along the lines of Burtless (1986) and Burt- 
less and Moffitt (1984). We consider both retiree health insurance in general 
and continuation benefits more specifically. Figure 4.1 shows the budget con- 
straint facing an older worker between the ages of 55 and 65. The horizontal 
axis represents the age of retirement. The vertical axis measures the certainty 
equivalent (CE) of consumption from age 55 onward. This differs from the 
earlier literature, which has typically considered the relationship between the 
age at retirement and  the actual level of future consumption rather than the CE 
of future consumption. This departure is necessitated by our focus on the effect 
of insurance coverage. 
We  assume that workers receive health insurance on their current job but 
that they may or may not have retiree health insurance coverage. Firms that 
provide postretirement  health insurance do so on the same basis for both work- 
ers and retirees, and these benefits cease upon eligibility for Medicare." We 
also assume that once workers leave their current job, they will remain retired 
for the rest of their life. To  simplify the analysis, we ignore the effects of both 
11. In reality, most retiree health insurance plans do "top off" Medicare to some extent. This 
does not alter the main conclusions of  this section. 127  Health Insurance and Retirement 
Cer to  i  nty 
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Fig. 4.1  Modeling the effect of continuation coverage on retirement 
Social Security and pensions; they could, however, be easily incorporated into 
the analysis. 
In the model, as in the real world, workers who retire without health insur- 
ance coverage have two options: they may purchase an individual policy, or 
go uninsured. In either case their out-of-pocket medical expenditures will be 
significantly higher than if they receive retiree coverage or have the option of 
continuing their group coverage. For a worker with retiree health insurance, 
the slope of the budget constraint will be the after-tax wage, which is depicted 
by  line AB in figure 4.1. Since medical expenditures are insured, there is no 
uncertainty about future consumption. 
For the worker without retiree coverage, the relative position and slope of 
the budget constraint depend on two factors. First, because individuals are risk 
averse, those without retiree health insurance will have a lower level of  CE 
consumption; this places the no-health-insurance  budget constraint below that 
of  an insured worker.'* Second, because both the mean and the variance of 
medical expenditures rise with age, a year of  health insurance coverage is 
worth more at older ages. The cumulative reduction in CE consumption will 
be  greater at younger retirement ages, but  the incremental effect will be 
smaller. This latter effect gives curvature to the no-health-insurance budget 
constraint, line CD in figure 4.1. At age 65 there is a jump in the no-health- 
insurance budget constraint as Medicare equalizes the opportunities  of all indi- 
viduals. 
If leisure is a normal good, retiree health insurance will lead to earlier retire- 
ment, at age R, <  R,, because such coverage makes individuals wealthier. As 
12. Risk aversion in this model operates in a similar fashion to higher expected medical costs. 128  Jonathan Gruber and Brigitte C.  Madrian 
individuals are more risk averse, the wealth effect will increase as both the 
level of the no-health-insurance budget constraint falls and its slope becomes 
steeper. 
Now consider the effect of  a continuation coverage mandate that provides 
one year of subsidized insurance coverage relative to having no health insur- 
ance. For the risk-neutral worker, this is simply equivalent to an increment in 
wealth equal to expected medical costs for a year minus the cost of the group 
policy.13  This increment rises in value as the worker ages, since expected medi- 
cal expenditures increase with age. Thus, the budget constraint with a continu- 
ation coverage option, line EE lies above the no-health-insurance constraint 
but below the retiree-coverage constraint. At younger ages, it is very close to 
the  no-health-insurance constraint; at  age  64, it  differs from the  retiree- 
coverage constraint by  the cost of  the group coverage. As workers become 
more risk averse and the no-health-insurance  constraint becomes steeper, the 
distance between the no-health-insurance and the continuation coverage con- 
straints will increase, and this increase will be greater at older ages. In this 
case the value of one year of coverage will equal expected medical costs minus 
the cost of the group policy plus the increase in CE consumption implied by 
eliminating uncertainty in that year. 
The value of both retiree health insurance and continuation benefits will rise 
with the cost of  being uninsured or the cost of  buying individual insurance 
in the private market. The important difference between these two sources of 
coverage, however, is their age patterns: while retiree insurance coverage is of 
highest value to very early retirees, continuation benefits are more valuable at 
older ages. Because of this, we might expect continuation benefits to be used 
primarily by older workers seeking a “bridge to Medicare,” which allows them 
to retire a certain number of months before age 65 without losing group cover- 
age. If this is the case, we would expect the effect of continuation coverage on 
retirement to be greatest at older ages. 
There are, however, a number of  complications that cloud this basic intu- 
ition. The first is the empirical violation of one of  our assumptions, namely, 
that retirement is permanent. Diamond and Hausman (1984) report substantial 
reentry rates for early retirees; among 55-64-year-olds, the one-year reentry 
rate is approximately 15%. Sueyoshi (1989) finds that one-third of the elderly 
“partially retire,” moving from permanent employment to less than full-time 
work. To the extent that continuation coverage mandates facilitate movement 
across jobs, rather than permanent retirement, they may have larger effects at 
younger ages than was depicted above.I4 
In this analysis we have assumed that retiree health insurance offers pure 
13. Once again, this amount is presumably positive even for a risk-neutral worker due to cross- 
14. One important consideration, of  course, is whether this reentry is to jobs that offer health 
subsidization of the group policy by younger coworkers. 
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rents to workers in the firms that offer this type of coverage. In labor market 
equilibrium, presumably at least a portion of  these rents will be reflected in 
lower wages for workers with retiree coverage. The extent to which these com- 
pensating differentials offset the benefits of  retiree health insurance at each 
age will be a function of  the employer’s ability to set relative age-specific 
wages freely,I5 the mobility of workers across firms at different ages, and the 
excess of the cost of continuation benefits over the group premium paid by the 
early retiree.I6  The existence of compensating differentials may  affect both 
the location and the shape of the budget constraint facing the potential retiree; 
the net effect on retirement age will be a function of the nature of the compen- 
sating differential.” 
Finally, we have ignored the possibility that workers may be liquidity con- 
strained in making their retirement decisions. The fact that most retirees have 
few liquid assets (Diamond and Hausman 1984) implies that such liquidity 
constraints may be empirically important in determining  retirement dates. This 
explanation is suggested in both Diamond and Hausman (1984) and Burtless 
and Moffitt (1984) in their discussion of why Social Security benefits do not 
seem to affect retirement until they actually become available at age 62. Sam- 
wick (1993) finds that much of the estimated increase in retirement probabili- 
ties attributed to Social Security occurs among those with pensions, suggesting 
that all workers would like to take advantage of these benefits early, but that 
only those with pensions can afford to do so. The presence of liquidity con- 
straints could increase the effect of continuation benefits at younger ages, as 
the wealth increment that these benefits represent could be loosening these 
constraints. 
4.4  Data and Regression Framework 
4.4.1  Data 
The data for this study must meet two key criteria. First, in order to exploit 
the variation in state and federal continuation coverage legislation, they must 
extend over a number of years before and after 1986. Second, there must be a 
15.  See Rosen  (1986) for a discussion of  the theory of  compensating differentials. Gruber 
(1994a) provides some evidence that shifting the costs of  employer-provided benefits to distinct 
demographic  groups in the workplace is feasible. 
16. Huth (1991) reports that the health insurance claims of COBRA recipients exceed those of 
active employees by  50%. This difference in cost is attributed  to adverse selection; it is the sickest 
individuals who will find continuation  coverage  most attractive,  and they will therefore be the ones 
most likely to take it up. Similar evidence is provided in Long and Marquis (1992). 
17. For example, if the entire cost of the benefits is shifted to older workers, this will lower the 
slope of the budget constraint with continuation  benefits (fig. 4.1) relative to the budget constraint 
without benefits (because wages for those with benefits fall), which will have both income and 
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large sample size so that the effects of state-law changes on older workers can 
be identified. The data that best meet these two criteria are the Merged Outgo- 
ing Rotation Group (MORG) sample of the CPS. The CPS is a nationally rep- 
resentative survey that interviews over fifty thousand households each month. 
The MORG file contains information on demographic characteristics  and labor 
force attachment during the survey week for one-quarter of  each month’s 
sample for each month of the year. This is the largest available annual data set 
on individual labor force behavior in the United States. 
Recent studies of retirement behavior have focused on dynamic modeling of 
the transition into retirement. In this paper we instead use a static model of 
whether or not an individual is currently retired, since the only labor force 
information we have in the MORG is for the week of the interview. Evidence 
on the stock of retired persons can still be useful for considering the effect of 
continuation coverage mandates on retirement; if the laws are affecting flows, 
they should affect stocks as well.L8  Furthermore, dynamic modeling strategies 
for retirement decisions using survey data sets often suffer from an important 
econometric difficulty,  known as dynamic sample selection bias (Diamond and 
Hausman 1984). In the case of  continuation coverage laws, this bias arises 
from the fact that the set of individuals observed actually working after the law 
has been in place for a number of  years would be less likely to retire in re- 
sponse to the law than would the entire population, because those most likely 
to respond will have already retired. When the sample is selected on the basis 
of those who are still working, the results will therefore be biased against find- 
ing an effect of the law.19 In a multivariate setting, the bias cannot be signed 
a priori, and with time-varying covariates in  the model, such as months of 
continuation coverage, it is impossible to correct for this “left-censoring.”20 
Our static regressions, which include all 55-64-year-old males regardless of 
initial work status, do not suffer from this bias. 
On the other hand, the major disadvantage of our static framework is that 
we cannot control for the characteristics of the job from which the individual 
has retired. This will be important if, for example, there is a systematic  correla- 
tion between the passage of these mandates and the nature of the jobs in the 
states where they are passed. In the regression analysis we attempt to reduce 
any bias that results from this potential correlation by controlling for the time- 
18. This is not strictly true if the mandates affect the number of  persons who decide to work at 
all; in this case, both the numerator and denominator of the labor force participation rate would 
be increasing, and the effect on the stock would be ambiguous. This is not likely to be a problem 
for the sample of older males on which we focus. 
19. An alternative way to see this point is to imagine a law that applied to a cohort rather than 
to an age group. The individuals who are most likely to respond to this law will do so in the first 
year. In the next year, by selecting on the set of individuals who have not yet retired, we will bias 
the results against finding an effect of the law. When the law applies to an age group, rather than 
a cohort, this effect is attenuated by the fact that new members arrive into the age group. 
20. It is possible, however, to test for the magnitude of the bias; see Gruber and Madrian (1995). 131  Health Insurance and Retirement 
invariant characteristics of the states that pass these mandates. In section 4.5 
we will contrast our findings from this static regression with those from dy- 
namic models that allow us to better control for the types of jobs held by indi- 
viduals. 
4.4.2  Regression Framework 
We  focus on two definitions of retirement: whether or not an individual re- 
ports being retired, and whether or not an individual is out of the labor force. 
Both are based on a CPS question that asks about the major activity in which 
an individual was engaged during the week before the survey. The latter defini- 
tion is useful because retirement may be a subjective term that takes on differ- 
ent meanings for different individuals. These retirement definitions are clearly 
problematic along at least two dimensions. First, we are unable to contrast the 
effect of these regulations on both “full” and “partial” retirement, as is done in 
Burtless and Moffitt (1984) or Sueyoshi (1989). Second, we are unable to ac- 
count for reentry into the labor market, as discussed in Diamond and Hausman 
(1984). Nevertheless, these measures should provide reasonable estimates of 
the effect of continuation coverage mandates on the propensity of older work- 
ers to remain employed. 
Our sample consists of men between the ages of 55 and 64. Overall, 20% of 
the sample report being retired, and 35% are out of the labor force. The average 
level of education is twelve years, and 9.5% of the sample is nonwhite. 
We estimate the following probit model of retirement: 
(1)  Pr(Retired,,) = @(a + p,*X,, + &*Statej + &*Timer + p,*Lawjr), 
where i indexes individuals,  j  indexes states, and t indexes time. Xi,,  is a set of 
individual demographic characteristics, Statej is a set of state dummies, Time, 
is a set of  year and month dummies, and Lawjr is the number of  months of 
continuation coverage available in state j at time t?  The state fixed effects 
control for any time-invariant characteristics of a state that may be correlated 
with the state’s propensity to pass continuation coverage legislation. We  in- 
clude a set of year dummies to control for national trends in retirement behav- 
ior that may be correlated with the passage of these laws, and month dummies 
to control for seasonal patterns in retirement behavior. Thus, the effect of the 
laws is identified in this model by changes in retirement behavior in states that 
passed the laws (or that were affected by  the federal law), relative to those 
that did not, during the period after the laws were passed. Further identifying 
variation comes from differences across states in the number of months of 
21. We  exclude individuals from two  states from our sample: Hawaii, which has mandated 
health insurance for all employees, and West Virginia, for which we were unable to definitively 
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eligibility that these laws allow. Since we have monthly data, we phase in the 
federal law in twelve equal increments between July 1986 and June 1987. 
4.5  Results 
The basic regression results are reported in table 4.9. The first column re- 
ports the probit coefficients from the self-reported retirement equation, while 
the second column gives the marginal probabilities implied by  these coeffi- 
Table 4.9  The Effect of Continuation Coverage on the Probability of 
Being Retired 
Definition of Retired 
Report Being Retired  Not in the Labor Force 
Marginal 
Independent Variable  Coefficient  Probability 
Months of  coverage  0.0036  ,0107 
Married  -  0.0 154  -  .0037 













Nonwhite  -0.1204  -  ,0282 
55 years old  -  1.205  -.1950 
56 years old  -  1.097  -.1853 
57 years old  -1.016  -.I770 
58 years old  -  0.925  1  -.1669 
59 years old  -0.8115  -.1525 
60 years old  -0.6254  -.1254 
61 years old  -0.4903  -.lo24 
62 years old  -0.0854  -  ,0203 
63 years old  0.1033  ,0260 















































Notes: The table gives estimates from a probit equation for whether or not an individual is retired, 
using data from the 1980-90  Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups of the Current Population Survey. 
The sample comprises 214,508 men aged 55-64.  Coefficients for year, month, and state dummies 
are not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. 133  Health Insurance and Retirement 
cientsZ2  The same is done in the third and fourth columns, using “not in the 
labor force” as the definition of retirement. More education is associated with 
a slightly lower probability of being retired and a much lower probability of 
being out of the labor force. Being nonwhite is associated with a lower proba- 
bility of retirement but a significantly higher probability of being out of  the 
labor force. Individuals who are married are less likely to be either retired or 
out of  the labor force. The age pattern of  retirement propensities is familiar 
from the previous literature; there is a large jump in the probability of being 
retired at age 62, and individuals aged 64 are 25% more likely to be retired 
than individuals aged 55. This pattern is even more pronounced for being out 
of the labor force, as the probability at age 64  is 40% greater than the probabil- 
ity at age 55. 
The availability of continuation coverage has a sizable and significant effect 
on the probability of being retired. One year of coverage raises the probability 
that an individual is retired by  1.1 percentage points, which is 5.4% of  the 
baseline probability of being retired in this sample. For the not-in-the-labor- 
force regressions, the estimated effect of a year of continuation coverage is of 
approximately the same magnitude as in the retired equation (although the 
coefficient is only significant at the 10% level), and suggests an increase in the 
baseline probability of being out of the labor force of 2.8%. 
The model described in section 4.3 suggests the possibility that the effect of 
continuation coverage mandates on retirement could vary with age; intuitively, 
it seemed that this effect should be strongest at older ages. In table 4.10, there- 
fore, we  free up the effect of  months of  continuation coverage by age. The 
second and fifth columns present the marginal probability derivatives of  the 
probits. The third and sixth columns express these percentage-point increases 
in retirement propensities as a fraction of the baseline retirement rate at each 
age. This allows for a more natural interpretation of the percentage effects of 
continuation benefits on retirement at each age. 
In both equations the coefficients rise with age and are statistically signifi- 
cant at ages 62 and above. The pattern of effects as a fraction of baseline retire- 
ment probabilities, however, is not uniformly supportive of the hypothesis sug- 
gested in section 4.3. For the retirement equation, there is actually a declining 
pattern of effects by  age; for the not-in-the-labor-force equation, the effects 
are slightly increasing with age. 
There are several possible explanations for this counterintuitive finding that 
the effects are not proportionately greatest at the ages near Medicare eligibility. 
22. For dummy variables, the marginal probabilities are calculated by predicting the probability 
of retirement with the dummy equal to one for the entire sample, predicting the probability with 
the dummy set equal to zero for the entire sample, and taking the average of the difference in these 
predictions across all individuals. For continuous variables, the marginal probability is calculated 
by  predicting the  probability at  the  current  level of the  variable, predicting the probability by 
adding one to the variable, and once again taking the average of the difference in these predictions 
across individuals. The marginal probability on months of coverage is the probability increase 
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Table 4.10  The Age-Specific Effect of Continuation Coverage on the Probability of 
Being Retired 
~  ~~ 
Definition of  Retired 
Report Being Retired  Not in the Labor Force 
Marginal  Percentage  Marginal  Percentage 
Independent Variable  Coefficient  Probability  of Baseline  Coefficient  Probability  of Baseline 
55*months  ,0028  ,0083  13.3  .0012  0047  2.4 
(.0023)  (.0019) 
56*months  .0013  ,0037  4.8  ,0022  ,0088  4.1 
(.0023)  (.0019) 
57'months  ,002  1  .0061  6.8  -.0005  -.0021  0.9 
(.0022)  (0019) 
%*months  ,0027  ,0080  7.6  .003 1  1.2 
(.0022)  (.0019) 
59*months  ,0046  .O 135  10.6  ,0019  .0074  2.6 
(.002  1)  (.0019) 
60*months  .0024  ,007  1  4.2  .0018  ,0069  2.1 
(.0021)  (.0018) 
6 1 *months  ,0020  .0060  2.9  ,002  1  ,0085  2.3 
(.0020)  (.0018) 
62*months  .0048  ,0143  4.2  ,0040  ,0161  3.2 
(.0020)  (.0018) 
63*months  ,0041  .0121  2.9  ,0045  .O 179  3.2 
(.0020)  (.0018) 
64*months  ,0067  ,0202  4.5  .0063  ,025  1  4.1 
(.0020)  (.0018) 
Notes: The table gives estimates from a probit equation for whether an individual is retired, using data 
from the 1980-90 Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups of the Current Population Survey. The sample com- 
prises 214,508 men aged 55-64.  Coefficients for year, month, age, and state dummies are not reported. 
Education, race, and marital status are also included. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The first is the set of  theoretical issues we raised in section 4.3, such as the 
possibility that individuals may face liquidity constraints that are loosened by 
this temporary health insurance. The second reason is statistical: we may not 
have enough power to these probits to distinguish true larger effects at older 
ages from the effects at younger ages. Given the precision of our estimates, this 
seems an unlikely explanation for the unexpected age pattern of  our results. 
Alternatively, it may be that our result is spurious. One potential problem 
with our identification  strategy is that the passage of these laws could be corre- 
lated with some other change in retirement behavior in these states. Alterna- 
tively, it could be  that  the  laws  themselves are endogenous responses to 
changes in retirement propensities among the population; that is, if more indi- 
viduals are retiring, states may respond by mandating benefits that cover indi- 
viduals after their retirement. 
One form of potential endogeneity could be that the propensity of legisla- 135  Health Insurance and Retirement 
tures to mandate continuation coverage is correlated with long-term within- 
state trends in retirement behavior. In this case, even with state fixed effects 
included in  the  regression,  there  will  be  a  spurious correlation between 
changes in retirement behavior within a state and the passage of a continuation 
coverage mandate. One possible control for such spurious causation is to in- 
clude in the regression not only state effects but state-specific  trend terms; that 
is, we interact each state effect with a trend for the ten-year period.23  The re- 
sults from this specification check are presented in table 4.11. For the not-in- 
the-labor-force regression,  the  age-specific  coefficients  are  virtually  un- 
changed from those in table 4.10; in the retirement equation, the coefficients 
are slightly larger, but once again the effects are very similar. 
A further potential problem with these findings is that it may not be appro- 
priate to compare the effects of the state and federal mandates. As we noted 
earlier, these mandates differ along a number of  dimensions, the most im- 
portant being that the state mandates do not apply to self-insured firms, while 
the federal mandate does not apply to small firms. In results not reported, we 
have rerun these regressions for the period prior to July 1986 in order to restrict 
our analysis to the effects of the state laws. The results are somewhat stronger 
than those in tables 4.10 and 4.11, although the age patterns are similar. 
In related work (Gruber and Madrian 1995), we consider the effect of con- 
tinuation benefits on transitions into retirement using two different data sets- 
the March files of the CPS, and the Survey of Income and Program Participa- 
tion (SIPP). These data sources allow us to estimate dynamic retirement mod- 
els and to control for some characteristics of the jobs from which individuals 
retire. The sample sizes are much smaller than we have with the MORG data, 
however, and we are confronted with the issue of dynamic sample selection, 
discussed above. Nevertheless, this study confirms the two key findings of the 
research reported above. First, there is a sizable and significant effect of contin- 
uation coverage on retirement behavior. Using one-year retirement transitions 
in the March CPS, we find that one year of continuation coverage raises retire- 
ment propensities by  1.4 percentage points. This is quite similar to the  1.1 
percentage-point effect estimated in this paper using the MORG data. Further- 
more, the implied effect on the hazard rate in both the March CPS and SIPP 
data is identical. 
Second, despite the presumption that these laws should act as a “bridge to 
Medicare,” the estimated effects in these dynamic models do not rise with age 
either. Figure 4.2 graphs the change in the propensity to be retired from having 
a year of continuation coverage estimated from the MORG regressions (col- 
umn three of table 4.10) along with the percentage increase in retirement prob- 
abilities estimated using transition data from the March CPS (Gruber and 
23. The trend is monthly, taking on values of  1 to 132. This type of “random growth” or “fixed 
trend” estimator is suggested by Heckman and Hotz (1988) and is used by Jacobson, LaLonde, 
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Table 4.11  The Effect of  Continuation Coverage on the Probability of Being Retired 
(fixed-trend included) 
~~ 
Definition of Retired 
Report Being Retired  Not in the Labor Force 
Marginal  Percentage of  Marginal  Percentage of 
Independent Variable  Coefficient  Probability  Baseline  Coefficient  Probability  Baseline 
Age effects equal 
Months of 
coverage 







6 1  *months 
62*months 
























,0133  6.7 
,0108  17.3 
,006  1  8.0 
,0087  9.7 
.0105  10.0 
.O 160  12.6 
,0097  5.7 
,0084  4.1 
.O 169  5.0 
.O 146  3.6 























,0105  3.0 
.0054  2.8 
,0094  4.4 
-.0013  0.5 
,0039  1.5 
,008 1  2.9 
,0077  2.4 
,009  1  2.5 
,0167  3.3 
,0184  3.2 
.0257  4.2 
Notes:  The table gives estimates from a probit equation for whether an individual is retired, using data 
from the 1980-90 Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups of the Current Population Survey. The sample com- 
prises 214,508 men aged 55-64.  Coefficients for year, month, age, and state dummies are not reported. 
Education, race, marital status, and state-specific trends are also included. Standard errors are in paren- 
theses. 
Madrian 1995).24  To  facilitate comparability, the two series are each normal- 
ized to take on a value of one at age 55. While the pattern of effects differs 
somewhat at the early ages, both series show a similar decline after age 59, 
and the effect at age 64 is approximately one-third as large as that at age 55. 
Thus, our two main findings from the static framework employed in this paper 
are borne out in the dynamic model that we employ elsewhere. 
24. These latter coefficients come from the model that is most comparable to that used in this 
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Fig. 4.2  Relative age-specific effects of continuation coverage on retirement 
It is also interesting to consider what the magnitude of these findings imply 
about individual valuation of continuation benefits by comparing them to the 
estimated increase in retirement propensities following an increase in postre- 
tirement income. The results from a static probit model of retirement in Sam- 
wick (1993) suggest that a $5,000 increment to Social Security wealth in- 
creases the retirement hazard by  approximately 8%. In a stochastic dynamic 
programming model employed by  Stock and Wise (1990a, 1990b) and Lums- 
daine, Stock, and Wise (1992, 1994), they find that a $5,000 increase in the 
value of pension wealth leads to an increase in the retirement hazard of be- 
tween 10 and 13% for individuals between the ages of 55 and 64.25 
The basic specification of Gruber and Madrian (1995) finds that one year of 
continuation coverage raises the retirement hazard by 32%. This implies that a 
year of  continuation benefits is valued at between $12,300 and $15,000 in 
terms of postretirement wealth. Based on the cost information reported in sec- 
tion 4.2, a COBRA policy would save an older worker approximately $4,500 
per year on the price of  family coverage. Taken  at face value, these results 
suggest that workers value the insurance received from continuation coverage 
policies at a somewhat higher level than its associated cost savings. This may 
reflect the fact that the individual policy we priced, as with most individual 
policies, excluded preexisting conditions for some period. Alternatively,  it may 
be that a number of early retirees must pay substantially more for individual 
policies or are unable to obtain such policies at all. 
25. We  are grateful to Andrew Samwick, Robin Lumsdaine, and James Stock for performing 
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4.6  Insurance Coverage 
In this section we consider the effects of continuation coverage mandates on 
the insurance coverage of early retirees. If continuation coverage mandates are 
having an effect on the retirement decisions of older workers, then, by defini- 
tion, they should be affecting their insurance coverage as well. Thus, evidence 
that such mandates increase insurance coverage among early retirees provides 
a necessary (but not sufficient) specification check of our result that these man- 
dates affect retirement behavior. Furthermore, it is interesting to contrast the 
direct effects of these mandates on insurance coverage with their indirect ef- 
fects on retirement behavior. To  what extent do continuation coverage man- 
dates affect the "inframarginal" individual, who would have retired in  their 
absence, relative to the "marginal" individual whose retirement decision is 
made in response to their presence? 
In order to investigate the effect of continuation  coverage mandates on insur- 
ance coverage, we use data from the SIpP.26  The SIPP is a nationally represen- 
tative survey of households designed to collect information on the economic 
and demographic characteristics of individuals and their families. We use data 
from the 1984,1985,1986, and 1987 panels of the SIPP. Sample members are 
interviewed every four months for roughly two and a half years and asked to 
provide information about their labor market activity, income, and participa- 
tion in welfare and transfer programs over the previous four months. The first 
interviews of the 1984 panel were conducted in October 1983, while the initial 
interviews for subsequent panels commenced in February of the corresponding 
calendar year. For previously cited reasons, we exclude individuals living in 
West Virginia and Hawaii. We  also drop individuals from several other small 
states because, out of concern for confidentiality, the SIPP has grouped these 
states together, thereby making it impossible to assign the appropriate state 
laws to individuals in these states.27 
We  restrict our sample to men aged 55-64  who retired during the sample 
period. The SIPP does not ask individuals directly whether they have retired. 
We therefore use a measure of retirement based on length of  time out of the 
labor force. This has the advantage, relative to point-in-time self-reported mea- 
sures, of capturing transitions to nonwork rather than partial (but perceived) 
retirement. It has the disadvantage, however, of not allowing us to disentangle 
retirement from other reasons for a temporary absence from the labor force. 
Following Rogowski and Karoly (1992), we define retirement as a departure 
26. To  keep the sample of individuals comparable to the MORG data used in this paper, one 
could in principle use the March CPS to look at insurance coverage over a similar time period. 
Unfortunately, a 1988 change in the questionnaire that altered the reported coverage rates of older 
individuals who were not working (precisely the group of interest) precludes performing a reliable 
analysis with this data set. 
27. These states are Alaska, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. The CPS results are similar if we restrict our CPS 
sample in the same fashion. See Gruber and Madrian (1995)  for more detail on our SIPP sample. 139  Health Insurance and Retirement 
Table 4.12  Continuation  Coverage and the Probability of Being Insured 
after Retirement 
Independent Variable  Coefficient  Marginal Probability 
Married  ,0820  ,026 
Black  -  ,8403  -  .293 
Education  ,0381  ,012 
Age  .1788  -  ,020 
Age2  -.oO01  - 







Notes:  The table gives estimates of  the probability of being insured after retirement, using data 
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation. The sample comprises 527 men aged 55-64 
who retired over the sample period. Coefficients for industry and occupation dummies are not 
reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
from the labor force of five or more months.z8  Individuals who are not in the 
labor force for at least the first four months for which we observe them are 
excluded from the sample, and individuals who report being out of the labor 
force in the last five months of the panel are censored at the last month for 
which they are in the labor force. 
Table 4.12 presents the results from a probit equation for whether or not an 
individual is covered by employer-provided health insurance after retirement. 
The key independent variable is the number of months of continuation cover- 
age available at the time of retirement. The results suggest that an extra month 
of continuation coverage increases the probability of being insured after retire- 
ment by 0.5%.  This implies that one year of coverage would increase the proba- 
bility of being insured by 6%,  while eighteen months would increase the prob- 
ability of coverage by 9%, a result consistent with that found by Rogowski and 
Karoly (1992). The results of table 4.12 corroborate the evidence on take-up 
rates presented in section 4.2. As mentioned, Zedlewski (1993) estimates that 
5.2% of  retired individuals between the ages of  55 and 64 are covered by 
COBRA. This fraction is very similar to our 6%  estimated increase in coverage 
from one year of continuation coverage, which is the average length of time 
for which older individuals receive COBRA (Flynn 1992). 
28. Rogowski and Karoly (1992) actually impose a six-month rule for departure from the labor 
force. It turns out that almost all of  the individuals who are out of the labor force for five months 
are actually out for six or more months. This definition of retirement helps alleviate the problem 
of  measurement error in the reporting of individual labor force status; since individuals are inter- 
viewed every four months, they must report that they are out of the labor force in two consecutive 
interviews to be counted as retired. See Gruber and Madrian (1995) for further discussion. 140  Jonathan Gruber and Brigitte C.  Madrian 
Furthermore, we can reconcile this finding with our estimates of the effect 
of continuation coverage mandates on retirement. Our findings imply that one 
year of coverage raised the probability of being retired by about 1.1 percentage 
points, but that it raises the probability of being insured by 6 percentage points. 
This suggests that the primary effect of these mandates is “inframarginal.”  That 
is, they provide insurance coverage for individuals who would have retired in 
the absence of these mandates even though they would not have been covered 
by employer-provided  health insurance. Thus, continuation coverage mandates 
may be policies with a sizable bang for the buck: they have a large and signifi- 
cant effect along their intended dimension, increased insurance coverage, with 
a  relatively  small effect  along  their unintended  dimension, increased re- 
tirement. 
4.7  Conclusion 
A number of current policy proposals in the United States, such as increas- 
ing the age of Medicare eligibility to 67 or providing guaranteed health insur- 
ance coverage for all citizens, would affect the health insurance coverage of 
early retirees. Thus, it seems especially important at this time to understand 
the interaction between insurance coverage and the retirement decision. If re- 
tirement is very sensitive to insurance coverage, for example, it could have 
important public finance implications for policies that provide universal health 
insurance coverage; a spate of retirement may nontrivially lower the tax base 
on which new policies can be financed. 
Our strategy for estimating the effect of health insurance on retirement has 
been to examine the effect of state and federal continuation coverage mandates 
on retirement propensities. We do this in a static regression framework, which 
allows us to exploit a very large data set and to avoid the problems of dynamic 
sample selection that plague other studies based on survey data. Our results 
suggest that continuation coverage mandates have a sizable and significant ef- 
fect on retirement. Contrary to our basic intuition, however, the effects are not 
necessarily the strongest at older ages. Rather, taken in conjunction with evi- 
dence from dynamic models, we appear to find declining effects by  age. We 
also found that one year of continuation benefits is associated with a 6% in- 
crease in insurance coverage levels, suggesting that these policies are not only 
inducing retirement, but are “inframarginally”  covering those who would have 
retired anyway. 
Our use of continuation coverage regulations as the source of variation for 
identifying the effect of insurance coverage on retirement has both advantages 
and disadvantages relative to looking directly at workers with and without 
employer-provided retiree health insurance. One potential problem with the 
latter strategy is that the researcher is unable to control for job characteristics 
that may be correlated with both the generosity of retiree health coverage and 
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pensions (which are accounted for in both Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise 1994 
and Gustman and Steinmeier 1994). There may be a number of other ways in 
which firms encourage or discourage retirement, however, such as through 
the tasks that they assign older workers or the wage profile that these workers 
are offered. Furthermore, there may be sorting of workers by retirement pro- 
pensities into the types of firms that do or do not offer retiree health insurance. 
To  the extent that these are unobserved by the econometrician but correlated 
with both the offering of retiree coverage and the retirement decision, they will 
bias the estimated effect of  such coverage on retirement. What is needed to 
identify the effect of retiree health insurance is exogenous assignment of such 
coverage to individuals that is independent of these other job characteristics. 
Continuation coverage  mandates potentially provide  such  exogenous  as- 
signment. 
The primary disadvantage of our strategy is that continuation benefits are 
more expensive to the early retiree than retirement health insurance and pro- 
vide coverage only for a limited number of  months. These differences may 
make it unreasonable to extrapolate our results to infer the effects of full retiree 
health insurance coverage. Future research should focus on combining a study 
of true employer-provided retiree coverage with an identification strategy that 
overcomes the omitted-variable  bias problems described above. 
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COInlllent  Richard J. Zeckhauser 
Old workers who turn out the widget, 
Here studied by Jon and by Brigitte, 
Their fondest desire 
Is just to retire, 
But the cost of health care makes them fidget. 
Legislation attuned to their plight: 
Makes twelve months’ insurance a right. 
With the cost now reduced, 
A five-point-four percent boost 
In retirement rate is in sight. 
Jonathan Gruber and Brigitte Madrian’s carefully crafted article springs from 
the observation that health insurance is a pricey commodity for individuals of 
prime retirement age, due to adverse selection and transactions costs. Recog- 
nizing this, a number of  states, and recently the federal government, have 
passed legislation requiring that companies sell continuing coverage to their 
departing employees. The price can’t exceed the average employee’s cost, plus 
a sliver. (The federal mandate now extends for eighteen months.) 
Such coverage slashes the costs of  health insurance. Not surprisingly, for 
each year of mandated coverage an additional 6% of retirees buy health insur- 
ance. The dramatic reduction in health insurance costs also makes retirement 
more attractive. Indeed, employing appropriate econometric wizardry, Gruber 
Richard J. Zeckhauser is the Frank P. Ramsey Professor of Economics at the John  F.  Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University, and a research fellow of the National Bureau of Eco- 
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and Madrian (GM) infer that an additional 1.1% of the 55-64-year-old  cohort 
choose retirement, which is 5.4% of its baseline value.’ 
The model implicit in figure 4.1 suggests that employees value the continued 
coverage by the certainty equivalent of the difference between the price for the 
extended insurance charge and a retiree’s other health coverage options-ei- 
ther the selection-biased price of privately purchased insurance, or the highly 
variable costs of self-insurance.  Since this difference grows as people get older 
and sicker, and health becomes more heterogeneous, the retirement induce- 
ment will grow with age. GM therefore predict that the older workers are, the 
more mandates for continuation of health coverage will increase retirement as 
a percentage of baseline. But they find the reverse. 
GM might have made the opposite prediction if they had pushed the hetero- 
geneity button a bit harder. Say potential retirees fall into two groups, Calibra- 
tors and Instinctuals. The Calibrators are the tribe traditionally studied by 
economists;2  they leave the Instinctuals to the sociologists. The Instinctuals 
range from bon vivants, the silver-haired types pictured on a golf course in 
national media advertising, to those too sick to work. One feature unites the 
Instinctuals-their  decision to retire is unaffected by  the cost of  health in- 
surance. 
Evidence on the incidence of illness by  age, including some presented by 
GM, show a rapid acceleration with age. For this reason alone, we would ex- 
pect many more Instinctuals to have retired at 64, say, than at 55. Conceivably 
the acceleration with age of  Calibrators’ induced retirements could be more 
than proportional to the Instinctuals’ upsweep. But maybe not. It depends in 
part on the elasticity of Calibrators’ retirement with respect to health costs at 
each age. 
The curve showing the number of  workers who will be induced to retire 
by  various levels of health savings may resemble many textbook labor-supply 
curves, with a range that is relatively flat followed by  a range that is fairly 
inelastic. When coverage costs are reduced, the “cheap retirers” will go early. 
And the escalation in benefits over time, as people get sicker, may not be suffi- 
cient to get “expensive retirers” to participate. For example, it is often found 
that companies’ early retirement plans disproportionately push out those at the 
1. The impact is actually greater than that, since many employers were presumably already 
offering coverage before the government mandated it. As the mandate increases, it becomes  a 
binding constraint on an ever-increasing percentage of firms. Assuming all months of coverage 
have the same effect, as GM do, this would produce a built-in nonlinearity. 
2. The Calibrators have quite a challenge, since the implicit calculations  are quite complex, 
probably sufficiently complex to defeat a pride of NBER researchers. GM find, for example, that 
one year of  continuation  coverage saves a worker $4,500 and has the same retirement conse- 
quences as $17,000 in Social Security wealth. They conclude, with reservations about variability 
among workers, that the two are worth the same. The logic doesn’t follow, since the former is a 
price effect, whereas the latter is an income effect. Pity the poor worker confronted  with this 
problem. Amos Tversky might explain the worker’s behavior better than Alfred Marshall. 145  Health Insurance and Retirement 
bottom end of the qualifying age range. And so it may be with some retirement 
due to reduced health care costs. 
Retirement is a complex decision, involving health, location, and friends, as 
well as dollar costs and benefits, and we should be cautious before predicting 
the age-specific effects of inducements. We should be more cautious still when 
making predictions relative to baselines, given the array of reasons why work- 
ers retire. 
GM are moving on to dynamic assessments of the transition to retirement in 
forthcoming work. They have already shown they can do the econometric nip- 
ups required to deal with sample selection issues. A bit of dextrous modeling 
as an accompaniment would now  help them distill more about who retires 
and why. 
GM  complement an  informative compilation of  background data-age- 
specific patterns of health, expenditures, and coverage-with  sound empirical 
methods to reach intuitive results. Embracing these results, what shall we make 
of mandates that require employers to sell health insurance to their retirees at 
a subsidized price? The economist’s first concern-excess  consumption-is 
hardly a problem: rational retirees would buy the insurance even at fair actuar- 
ial prices. 
What of  distributional consequences? Until wage adjustments work through 
the system-which  could take quite a while, given that the system shock is a 
government mandate-these  impositions represent a transfer from continuing 
workers to retirees. In the long run, wages will be pushed down to pay for this 
new mandated benefit, which thus becomes an imposed subsidy of one group 
by another. 
What are the welfare consequences  of this imposed subsidy? Should rational 
employers dealing with rational workers offer such coverage voluntarily? At 
least to deal with the adverse selection problem, it might seem so. Subsidized 
insurance is a second-best remedy to the hidden information problem. Add 
to this the labor economist’s belief that age-earnings profiles are steeper than 
productivity profiles, which implies that older workers don’t earn their keep. A 
subsidy for retirement may promote efficiency in the composition of  a com- 
pany’s labor force, quite apart from saving the company money. 
The company should also be concerned about who decides to retire in return 
for  this  small  health  coverage benefit.  (The federally mandated  eighteen 
months saves the retiree roughly $7,000, but costs the company far less, since 
it also subsidizes health coverage for older workers who do not retire.) If  the 
most talented workers, who are presumably underpaid given bureaucratic con- 
straints at firms, dash to retire (perhaps due to confidence that they  can get 
another job), this will be poor policy. But if  the sickly take off, reassured by 
coverage for a period in retirement, it looks more promising. In any delibera- 
tion by the firm, it should recognize, as GM find, that an extension of coverage 
induces about 5.5 times as many people to buy insurance as it does to retire. 146  Jonathan Gruber and Brigitte C. Madrian 
In the short run, this multiplies the cost enormously. In the long run, downward 
wage adjustments wash out this effect. In sum, particularly in an era when 
many established firms are downsizing, continued health coverage in retire- 
ment may be an inexpensive way around a range of labor market rigidities. 
What of the government’s interest in promoting health coverage continua- 
tion? Some would argue that the government needs to step in due to market 
imperfections in  the insurance market for older workers. But firms already 
have an incentive to address this problem on their own. The intensity of govern- 
ment action in this area is probably due to a desire to provide a subsidy to a 
specified group of workers-those  about to retire-leaving  till later the worry 
about who will ultimately pay. 
The government’s major concern should be whether we  want workers to 
retire. If you think the size of the labor force is relatively fixed, a popular but 
noneconomic viewpoint, then you might promote retirement to spread things 
around. An economist would urge the government to consider the relationship 
of expected Social Security less taxes to retirement age. Since the relationship 
is strongly negative, the government should be in the business of delaying, not 
promoting, retirement. 
These are revolutionary times in  health insurance. Market conditions are 
forcing firms to drastic action. The federal government may soon make dra- 
matic moves. GM demonstrate that even comparatively modest changes in gov- 
ernment health coverage regulations have significant effects on retirement be- 
havior. Their paper offers a more general lesson: health insurance interventions 
by the government have significant effects on the operation of labor markets. 